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INTRODUCTION

NYA and Harrisons entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract with addenda
(collectively "REPC") in November 2006 under the terms of which NYA was purchasing
the Harrisons' real property with a closing date of October 31, 2007.

The REPC

permitted NYA, at its sole discretion, to make monthly $6,250.00 payments of additional
earnest money, in addition to the initial $10,000 earnest money deposit, in order to extend
~

the closing date of the REPC ·on a monthly basis beyond the original October 31, 2007
closing date to the end of the next month. Beginning in October, 2007 NYA began
paying the monthly additional earnest money deposits and paid the total amount of
$137,503.00 in additional earnest money deposits to extend the closing date.
Contrary to the express terms of the REPC they had signed, in March 2009,
Harrisons unilaterally asserted that a reasonable time for NYA to close had already
passed, that NYA was in breach by failing to close and dema11ded that NYA close by
August 5, 2009 or they would exercise their rights under the REPC. The instant litigation ·
was commenced by NYA in June, 2009 asserting claims of rescission, breach of contract
and declaratory judgment regarding the REPC.

In July, 2009, Harrisons filed a

counterclaim which asserted claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. On August 31, 2009, NYA tendered another $6,250 earnest
~

money deposit in order to extend the closing date for an additional month. Although
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NYA had the right to extend the closing in its sole discretion by making such monthly
payment, because the August 31 st payment was being tendered beyond Harrisons'
arbitrarily and illegally demanded August 5, 2009 closing date and in light of the pending
litigation, NYA included a letter of explanation as to its reasons for extending. The letter
requested an acknowledgement from Harrisons that NYA was entitled to extend the
closing in accordance with the express terms of the REPC. Harrisons rejected NYA's
valid tender, returned NYA's earnest money deposit, demanded the withdrawal of what
were characterized as "inappropriate conditions" and asserted that the NYA's actions
constituted additional breaches of the REPC.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted NYA's
motion and denied Harrisot;is' motion, ruling that:
(a)

NYA was not obligated to close within a reasonable time because the

REPC provided for a specific closing date and for unlimited monthly extensions of the
specific closing date;
(b)

NYA had not breached the REPC or the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing;
(c)

NYA's tender of the August 2009 earnest money payment was valid tender

because it only included conditions that NYA had a right to insist upon;
(d)

Harrisons breached the REPC by refusing the August 2009 tender of

additional earnest money deposit; and
2

G

(e)

NYA was entitled to its contractual remedies under the REPC against

Harrisons.
NYA filed a subsequent motion for summary judgment for judgment for the return
of its earnest money deposits, for liquidated damages in an amount equal to its earnest
..JJ

money deposits, interest and attorney's fees.

NYA was granted judgment for the

$147,503 earnest money deposits which it had paid to Harrisons, interest thereon but only
from August 31, 2009 and certain of its attorneys fees.

The court denied NYA's

judgment for liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money deposits as
provided in the REPC, and interest thereon because it incorrectly ruled that NYA had
elected to pursue other remedies at law namely actual damages. The court failed to
award certain of NYA's attorneys fees including some for research and client
consultation because the trial court said the issues researched and issues discussed with
the client were not described. The trial court also failed to award those attorneys fees
associated with its liquidated damage claims because it was not the prevailing party on
the liquidated damages issue.
Harrisons appealed the judgement and NYA cross appealed with respect to the
~

denial of its claims for liquidated damages, interest and attorneys fees. NYA submits
herewith its Reply Brief as Cross-Appellant.
ARGUMENT

3

I.
NYA ELECTED TO AND WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES
Harrisons argue that NYA elected the remedy of actual damages and that by electing such
remedy, NYA is precluded from seeking liquidated damages. Harrisons also argue for the

first time that once NYA sued Harrisons that it foreclosed its option to demand and
receive liquidated damages from Harrisons. That is not Utah law. The general rule of
election of remedies is set forth in Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P .2d 772, 778,
(Utah 1983) where the Supreme Court stated that:

The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its
purpose is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double
redress for a single wrong. Said do~trine presupposes a choice between
inconsistent remedies, a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of
fraud or imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose
to forego all others. Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp.,
Utah, 603 P.2d 793, 796 (1979) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
As stated above, the purpose of election of remedies is to prevent a double
redress for a single wrong. Contrary to Harrisons' position, the Utah Court of
Appeals did not reject the application of Angelos_to the remedies under the Utah
REPC. In Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061-1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), while
quoting the above language, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that:
The Palmers contend that the holdings in the Andreasen line of cases are
inconsistent with the election of remedies doctrine defined in Angelos v.
First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983) ... Contrary to
the Palmers' contention, the Andreasen line of cases does not conflict with
Angelos. The Andreasen line does not dispute the fact that election of
remedies is a procedural rule; the cases simply define the procedure for
4
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electing remedies. The cases uniformly hold that before a seller may pursue
a remedy other than liquidated damages, the seller must release any claim
to the deposit money. Andreasen, 335 P.2d at 408; Dowding, 555 P.2d at
957; Close, 354 P.2d at 857; McMullin, 349 P.2d at 721.
Contrary to Harrisons' assertion, the general principles of Angelos apply to the
REPC. Those applicable principles of Angelos are that the doctrine: (1) presupposes a
choice between inconsistent remedies, (2) a knowledgeable selection of one of those
choices, and (3) a resort to the chosen remedy that evinces a purpose to forego other
vJ

choices. It is just that the REPC and the cases which have interpreted them have defined
the procedure for sellers to elect remedies under the REPC.
From McKean v. Crump, 2002 UT App 258 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) and other Utah
cases, it is clear that the seller seeking to recover actual damages from the buyer must
return the earnest money or the seller will be deemed to have elected to accept the earnest
money as liquidated damages. Harrisons assert that there is no principled reason to treat
a buyer under a REPC differently from a seller. Their assertion is not true because there

viJ

are significant differences between the sellers' circumstances and their elections and
those of buyers generally and NYA in particular NYA that warrant different treatment.
First, while there are a number of Utah cases that have addressed the election of
remedies by a seller under a REPC, there are no Utah cases which have addressed the
buyer' selection of remedies under a REPC. Nor for that matter are there Utah cases

~

which have addressed the specifics of the buyer's election of liquidated damages versus
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the buyer's election of actual damages under the REPC. The relevant Utah cases have
been cases in which the seller has retained the earnest money deposit and has sought to
nonetheless bring action for actual damages. The courts have deemed the retention of the
eamest money as an election to recover liquidated damages and have refused to pennit
such sellers to proceed with their actual damages claims. The Utah cases have not
addressed what constitutes an election by the buyer to proceed with actual damages
which ·would foreclose the buyer's right to seek liquidated damages. It is the supposed
election by NYA of an actual damages remedy which the trial court and Harrisons claim
precludes NYA from asserting its liquidated damages claim against Harrisons. No Utah
cases have addressed such circumstance.
Second, there are significant differences in the language of the instant REPC
between a seller's remedies and its election of remedies versus a buyer's remedy and its
election of remedies. REPC ,I16 provides as follows:
DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return it and sue Buyer to
specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law.
If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer
may elect to either accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest· Money
Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this
contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept
liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer
upon demand.
I

Under the language of,I16, a seller may elect to retain the earnest money as
liquidated damages. ,I16 then states that in order to sue to specifically enforce the
6

contract or to pursue other remedies at law the seller is specifically required to "return
[the earnest money] and sue Buyer ... " The various cases which have interpreted the
above and similar language have held that it is the failure to return the earnest money
which constitutes an election to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages. Under
such cases, in order for sellers to sue to enforce the contract or to pursue other remedies
at law, sellers are contractually obligated to first return the earnest money deposit "and"
then they can sue. Consistent with the language of the REPC, sellers who have not first
returned the earnest money are not permitted to sue to obtain actual damages. See
McKeon v. Crump . 2002 UT App 258, 53 P.3d 494 and the various cases cited therein at
page 496. Consistent with Angelos, sellers' retention of the earnest money is their
knowledgeable selection of the choice to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
~

and their retention of the earnest money is their resort to their chosen liquidated damages
remedy evincing a purpose to forego other remedy choices.
However, different language applies to the buyer under the REPC. If a seller
defaults, under if 16, in addition to the return of the earnest money, a buyer may "elect to
accept from seller a sum equal to the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, or

va

may sue seller to specifically enforce the contract or may pursue other remedies available
at law." Under such language a way that a buyer elects liquidated damages is if the buyer
"accept from seller a sum equal to the earnest money deposit'.'. The common meaning of
"accept" is "to take or receive (something offered)" Random House Webster's College
7

Dictionary ( 1999). Applying that meaning to the above contract language, a buyer would
be deemed to have elected liquidated damages if they "received" and "accepted" a sum
equal to the earnest money. There is no evidence that NYA ever received or accepted
from Harrisons a sum equal to the earnest money deposit. If Harrisons had paid NYA a
sum equal to the earnest money deposits and NYA had "accepted" such sum, then NYA
would be deemed to have elected the remedy of liquidated damages under 116 and would
be precluded from proceeding with a claim for actual damages. An alternative legal
meaning of "accept" is in the context of contract formation and other similar
circumstances in which if an offer is made to a party, that party can "accept" the offer,
thereby forming a contract. There is no evidence that Harrisons ever even offered to pay
NYA an amount equal to the earnest money deposits as liquidated damages, so there was
no offer of a sum equal to the earnest money as liquidated damages that NYA could or
did accept. The last sentence of116 states: "If Buyer elects to accept liquidated
damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand." This
language indicates that there is an alternate election of liquidated damages by the buyer
that could be made other than the actual acceptance of an amount equal to the earnest
money. But unlike the earlier language of 116, the election under this sentence is based
on the buyer's "electing" to accept liquidated damages. No specific procedure or method
for the election is contractually specified. As such the buyer would be deemed to have
made such election if the buyer had complied with the requirements of Angelos, namely
8

the buyer had made a knowledgeable selection of a particular remedy and had resorted to
that chosen remedy evincing a purpose to forego all other remedies. There is no evidence
~

that NYA made a knowledgeable selection of actual damages nor that it resorted to actual
damages as its chosen remedy evidencing a purpose to forgo other remedies such as
~

liquidated damages.
The third difference between sellers and buyers is that the default clause on the
election of remedies is to be more strictly applied to sellers. This is due, at least in part,
to the fact that sellers have received and continue to hold the earnest money deposit. As
stated in McKeon, supra, at page 496, quoting Close v. Blumenthal, 11 Utah 2d 51,354
P .2d 856, 857 (1960) the default clause is "almost invariably against a purchaser" and the
"suit is by a seller who wants to be sure to keep the money in hand, and also seek
additional relief." For that reason the courts have stated that: "Under those

circumstances the clause should be strictly applied against the seller and he should be
held to meet its requirements with exactness. ,, These same type circumstances exist in
the instant case. The Harrisons have received the initial $10,000.00 earnest money
deposit that was released to them as well as the subsequent monthly earnest money
v))

deposits totaling $137,503.00 that were also released to them. (,I9 of Addendum No. 1 of
REPC, RISS, R142, R151, Second Affidavit of Steven Kelly ,I,I 7-8, R283 and Affidavit
of Steven Kelly ,Il 9, R817). Despite having received such substantial amounts of earnest
money and having breached the REPC, Harrisons have retained all of the earnest money.
9

They have neither returned the earnest money nor paid any of the liquidated damage
amount to NYA nor offered to pay or return any such amounts. As referenced in
McKeon and Close, Harrisons seek to keep the money in hand.
While the default clause is to be strictly applied against the Harrisons as sellers,
Utah cases do not provide that it is to be similarly strictly applied to NYA as buyers. Nor
is there any reason to strictly apply it against buyers nor to apply it in the same way
against the buyer. NYA p~id the earnest money to Harrisons and does not continue to
hold such money. It seeks the return of the earnest money deposit and an amount equal
to the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages to compensate it for the Harrisons'
breach.
Despite Harrisons unwillingness to return the earnest money they had received and
to pay liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money they had received,
Harrisons' interpretation of the contract regarding the election of remedies, result in NYA
being faced with a Robson's Choice regarding liquidated damages: namely NYA must
either ( 1) accept from the Harrisons a sum equal to the earnest money as liquidated
damages (which Harrisons had not offered nor were willing to offer) or (2) bring suit
against Harrisons and thereby lose their entitlement to recover liquidated damages from
Harrisons. Because, according to Harrisons, once a buyer sues the seller, it forecloses the
option of demanding and receiving liquidated damages from the seller. (Harrisons brief
at page 20.) Harrisons cite no case law to support their interpretation. The illogic of their
10

position is readily apparent. If, as in the instant case, the seller does not voluntarily
return the earnest money paid and does not pay the buyer an amount equal to the earnest
~

money paid as liquidated damages, then the only recourse for the buyer would to bring
suit against the seller for such return and liquidated damages. However, according to
·~

Harrisons, if the buyer brings suit against the seller, then it forecloses the buyer's right to
receive and buyer is not entitled to receive liquidated damages. The result under
Harrisons' argument, is that by bringing suit against the seller the buyer has elected to
pursue its remedies at law and must pursue such remedies, including actual damages,
instead. Moreover, under Harrisons' argument, the last sentence of,I16 is also effectively
unenforceable. The last sentence provides that if the buyer elects to accept liquidated
damages the seller agrees to pay them upon demand. But, if the seller fails to pay the
liquidated damages demanded and the buyer sues to recover the liquidated damages,
under Harrisons' argument, when the suit is brought by the buyer, it forecloses the
buyer's option to receive the liquidated damages demanded. Under Harrisons'
nonsensical interpretation of the REPC, there is no way for a buyer to recover liquidated
damages that a seller does not voluntarily pay. The provision for buyer's right to
liquidated damages is effectively written out of the REPC. The REPC cannot be
interpreted to grant a buyer a meaningless and unenforceable remedy for or an impossible
entitlement to the contractually provided liquidated damages remedy.

11

Harrisons base their interpretation of,f16 on the use of "or" in ,f16's language
regarding buyer's remedies which Harrisons assert is disjunctive. It is true that the term
"or" is generally disjunctive but even though "or" may be disjunctive, it is not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Sometimes "or" is used in a context in which the alternates are
mutually exclusive such as "The man is either a Utah resident or is not a Utah resident."
A man could not be both. However, the most common usage of the disjunctive "or" does
not denote mutually exclusive alternates. For example, "A man can walk or run to the
store" is not mutually exclusive. A man could either walk to the store, or he could run to
the store, or he could do both by walking part of the way and running part of the way.
Similarly, a check paid to the order of John Doe "or" Jane Doe can be signed or endorsed
by either John Doe or Jane Doe to be a valid endorsement. But it can also be endorsed by
both John Doe and Jane Doe and would still be a valid endorsement. The endorsement
by one of them does not preclude the other from also endorsing the check as well nor
does it invalidate the endorsement of either party. See, also, Hebertson v. Bank One,

Utah, N.A., 995 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah App (1999) where the party was only required to satisfy
.one of two conditions separated by "or" but there is no indication that one and only one
of such conditions could be met; In Re Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207,215 (Utah
1997) where use of "or" did not require all three provisions to be met, but any one of the
three, or for that matter satisfying all three provisions were sufficient, but again there is
no indication that one and only one condition could be met; and most helpful Edwards v.
12

Powder Mt. Water & Sewer, 214 P.3d 120, 128 (Utah 2009) where use of the disjunctive
"or" in Rule l l(c)(2) did not limit the court to imposing a single sanction but allowed the
imposition of both sanctions which were separated by the word "or".
More significantly, the underlying concept of election of remedies does not require
~

the pleading of one but only one remedy to the exclusion of the other remedy. As
previously stated in NYA's brief, modem pleading practice allows a party to plead
alternative theories and damages, to have their alternative theories presented to the court
or jury and to be awarded the relief to which the party is entitled (See NYA's brief at
pages 38 and 39). In Angelos the plaintiff had sought judgments against a bank as well as
the individual defendants. Election of remedies did not preclude such alternate pleading
nor the recovery of judgments against both under the alternate pleading. Rather as stated
above, election of remedies merely prevents double recovery for a single wrong.
Harrisons argue that NYA apparently recognized the choice between demanding
liquidated damages and suing Harrisons because it did not mention liquidated damages in
its allegations or prayer for relief. Harrisons have no basis for making such assertion
about NYA. As previously mentioned, in its initial brief, the Utah Rules of Civil

vJ

Procedure impose very limited notice pleading requirements for pleading as to a claim.
The amended complaint sets forth its various claims including a claim for damages. In
the prayer on the second claim, upon which the court granted NYA's motion for

·,.J

summary judgment as to Harrisons' breach, NYA prayed that the REPC should be
13

rescinded and for an award of the return of its earnest money, but also prayed consistent
with the alternative damage claim of the second claim that if the court determined that the
REPC was binding that it prayed for "a judgment awarding New York the damages that it
incurred as a result of the Defendants' breach of the REPC."
Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition defines damages as "Money claimed 'by,
or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury." Black's defines
actual damages as "An amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven
injury or loss". Black's also defines liquidated damages as "An amount contractually
stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual damages to be recovered by one party if
the other party breaches." Liquidated damages are a means of measuring, estimating or
determining the damages suffered by the nonbreaching party as a result of the breaches of
the defaulting party to a contract. Since liquidated damages are a contractually stipulated
estimate of the actual damages occurring from a breach they are and would be included in
the prayer for damages alleged by NYA as to its second claim.
Most importantly, Harrisons' brief does not address but misses the error in the trial
court's ruling. The trial court held that NYA was obligated to make a written notice or
demand on the Harrisons for liquidated damages and that by failing to do so NYA had
contractually elected to pursue actual damages. Such ruling is inconsistent with the
language of,ll6 of the REPC and Angelos. There is nothing in the language of,ll6
which requires the buyer to make a written demand for liquidated damages in order to
14

seek liquidated damages as its remedy. Rather, as discussed above, the contractual
language provides that acceptance from Seller of a sum equal to the earnest money
vi)

deposit may serve as the election. Alternatively, a buyer can elect to accept liquidated
damages. But no procedure is defined or described for this alternate election. Without a
viJ

defined method or procedure, then under Angelos, the buyer would elect the liquidated
damages when it made a knowledgeable selection of liquidated damages and resorted to
it in a manner which evidenced a purpose and intent to forego the other remedies
available to the buyer. By the same token, a buyer would elect the actual damages
remedy when it made a knowledgeable selection of actual damages as its remedy and
resorted to actual damages in a manner which evidenced a purpose and intent to forego
the other remedies available to the buyer such as liquidated damages.
In the instant case, there is no evidence of an election by NYA of the actual
damages remedy, not in the amended complaint or otherwise. There is no evidence of
NYA resorting to the actual damages remedy in a manner that evidenced its purpose and
intent to forego its other remedies, in particular there is no evidence of anything that
NYA did to evince that it was foregoing its claim to liquidated damages. In contrast it is
clear that NYA made a knowledgeable selection of liquidated damages as its remedy. In
NYA's motion for summary judgment filed on January 9, 2012 and the memoranda in
support of the motion, NYA sought not only the return of the earnest money which had
been paid, but liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money which had
15

been paid (R.178-9, 290-319 (particularly 293-5), 354-382 (particularly 355). Also in
NYA's motion for summary judgment for damages filed on December 13, 2013 and the
memoranda in support of such motion, NYA again sought the return of the earnest money
it had paid and liquidated damages in an amount equal to the earnest money (R. 728-752,
R. 822-852). None of such amended complaint, motions, memoranda, or other pleadings ·
nor any other facts evidence that NYA resorted to any other remedy, including a9tual
damages evincing a purpose to forego liquidated damages.
In summary, NYA did not elect actual damages and it did not forego its right to
seek liquidated damages from Harrisons. The judgment of the trial court so ruling and
denying NYA's right to recover liquidated damages from Harrisons in the amount of the
earnest money paid by NYA to Harrisons should be reversed. The court should remand
the matter to award NYA liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money paid by
NYA to Harrisons and to award NYA its attorneys fees associated with its claim for
liquidated damages, both at trial and on appeal.

II.
NYA IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S
FEES
The trial court failed to award certain of NYA's attorneys fees because the
descriptions of the work identified research, but without a description of the subjects or
issues researched, and also failed to award certain of NYA's attorneys fees for discussion
of legal issues with NYA because the legal issues discussed were not detailed. NYA

16

objected to providing such detail because it would involve the disclosure of attorney
work product and may involve the disclosure of confidential attorney client privileged
information. But NYA did provide affidavits that the research performed were relative to
the issues included in the various memoranda and were otherwise relevant and necessary
to the prosecution of its claims. Although Utah case law does require a reasonably
detailed description of the time spent and work performed, Harrisons have cited no cases
which have required detailed descriptions of the research or the subjects of the research
performed or to detail the legal issues discussed with a client. There is no case law which
requires such detail.
The court should remand the matter to the trial court to award additional attorneys
fees for the attorney yvork that was denied because the descriptions of the work
~

performed did not include the subjects or issues researched or the legal issues discussed
with the client.

viP

III.
NYA IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL PREJUDGMENT INTEREST FROM
THE DATE OF EACH PAYMENT OF EARNEST MONEY.
Harrisons argue that NYA is only entitled to prejudgment interest from the
August 31, 2009 date of breach and not from the date of each payment of earnest money.
In support Harrisons cite the Court to the case of Staker v. Huntington Cleveland
Irrigation Co., 664 P .2d 1188, 1191 (Utah 1983). Harrisons assert that Staker stands for
the proposition that prejudgment interest is to be awarded not from the date of each

17

overpayment of irrigation fees but from the date the overpayment is establish. However,
the actual ruling in Staker was that Mr. Staker was entitled to interest on the refund of
overpaid fees, for some undiscussed reason, from the date of his demand for such refund.
In responding to Staker, the Utah Supreme Court in Trail Mt. Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State
Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Utah 1996) discounted the ruling in Staker because

it involved what the Court characterized as "a relatively unique fact situation involving
the refund of overpaid amounts". Instead in Trail Mt. Coal Co., the Utah Supreme Court
held that prejudgment interest accrued from the date each payment of royalties was due,
not the date of demand. Id. at 13 7l. In doing so, the Court relied on Bjork v. April
Indus., 560 P .2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977) and its statement that: "where the damage is
complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be
measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time ...."
Harrisons argue that Anderson v. Doms, 2003 UT App 241, 75 P.3d 925 cited by
NYA and which awarded prejudgment interest from the date of the respective payments
under a real estate contract is inapplicable because it involved rescission of a contract as
opposed to damages from a breach of contract. It is true that Anderson involved the
remedy of rescission, but the recission resulted from a breach of the contract (involving
an encumbrance on the property) versus a claimed fraud. It is also true that the goal of
rescission is to return the parties to the status quo that existed prior to the parties'
agreement. Id at ,r1 1. But the purpose of an award of damages, particularly as applied to
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the facts in the instant case, is not significantly different. As stated in Mahmood v. Ross
(In re Estate ofRoss), 1999 UT 104, 990 P.2d 933, ,I19 (Utah 1999):

"As a general rule, legal damages serve the imp011ant purpose of compensating an
injured party for actual injury sustained, so that she may be restored, as nearly as
possible, to the position she was in prior to the injury." Castillo v. Atlanta Cas.
Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages§§ 1, 3
(1966).
The award of prejudgment interest assists in such restoration process by giving the
damaged party the benefit of interest on such damages for the period prior to the entry of
judgment. As stated in Trail Mt. Coal Co., Supra at page 1370:
As a matter of public policy, an award of prejudgment interest simply serves to
compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and,
as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is
liquidated and owing.
,I16 of the REPC provides that in the event of a breach of the REPC that the buyer
is entitled to the return of the earnest money deposits which it has made. Because of the
breach by Harrisons, NYA is entitled to be restored as nearly as possible to the position it
~

was in prior to the injury in accordance with the REPC. As such and in accordance with
ifl6 NYA is entitled to the return of the earnest money deposits which it had paid
Harrisons. Harrisons have had the various earnest money deposits paid by NYA and the
benefit of their use while NYA has not had such funds nor been able to use such funds.
Moreover, as generally recognized and as identified in Trail Mt. Coal Co., there has been
depreciation in the value of those monies over the period of time that Harrisons have had
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the monies and used them. Under both Trail Mt. Coal Co. and Mahmood, NYA is
entitled to be compensated for both the loss of use of their funds paid to Harrisons and
their depreciated value which has occurred during the time that Harrisons have had and
used such funds. The mechanism to so compensate NYA is by awarding NYA
prejudgment interest on those funds at the statutory rate provided in UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 15-1-1 (2) from the date each respective payment was paid by NYA and not just from the

date of Harrisons' breach of the REPC as was awarded by the trial court. Also, if NYA
is not awarded prejudgment interest for the periods prior to Harrisons' breach, then
Harrisons will have been rewarded for their breach by the interest free use of NYA's
monies.
To comport with the above principles, the court should remand. the matter to the
trial court to award NYA prejudgment interest on each of the earnest money payments it
paid to Harrisons from the dates thereof, and not just from the date of the Harrisons
breach.
CONCLUSION

The court should deny Harrisons' appeal and should affirm the court's orders from
which Harrisons appealed. The court should reverse the court's order that NYA elected
actual damages and should remand the matter to the trial court to award NYA liquidated
damages and interest on the liquidated damages, to award NYA interest on the earnest
money payments from the dates thereof and to award attorney fees relative to its claims
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for liquidated damages, for research work not awarded and for its attorneys fees on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of August, 2015.

avid D. Jeffs
Attorney for Plaintiff/Ap ellee/Cross Appellant
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 373-8848
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